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Consider a bank which securitizes part of its loan portfolio by issuing collat-
eralized debt obligations: What does this transaction imply for the default
risk exposure of the issuing institution? This study will look at ﬁnancial
institutions that securitize part of their loan book, analyzing the impact
of securitization on risk and market value of the issuing bank. Our focus
is on tranching as the ﬁnancial innovation characterizing collateralized debt
obligations (henceforth CDOs). Tranching matters because it determines the
eventual sharing of default risks between a bank as the issuer and investors
as the buyers of these bonds.
First, and contrary to what many observers believe, the expected default
loss of the securitized portfolio largely remains on the books of the issuing
institution. Second, in a fully funded transaction the risk of extreme unex-
pected losses, i.e. tail risk, is tranferred from banks to investors, mostly other
ﬁnancial institutions, or institutional investors. We argue that the combined
eﬀect of retaining the ﬁrst-loss piece and selling senior tranches will reduce
the bank’s exposure to extreme, or systemic risk.
But this potentially enables the bank to expand its loan business so that
in the end its systematic risk will be aﬀected. The direct consequences of
loan securitization on the bank’s default risk are derived from simulations of
the portfolio’s default rates. The default rate distribution and the ﬁrst loss
position of the bank jointly determine the eventual risk transfer to investors
in a fully funded transaction.
Additional insights are obtained from analyzing the eﬀect of default rate
correlations on the bank’s aggregate position. Usually a bank securitizes only
part of its loan book. Hence the risk eﬀect of securitization also depends
on the correlation between the securitized and the non-securitized loans.
Higher correlations are generated by a stronger exposure of the loans to a
macrofactor of default risks. The strength of this factor determines the shape
of the portfolio’s loss distribution and the extent of risk reduction achieved
by securitization. It also aﬀects the joint risk eﬀect of securitization and the
ensuing expansion of the loan business. In the end, the diversiﬁcation eﬀect
of attracting more loans of diﬀerent obligors in diﬀerent industries will be
smaller the smaller are idiosyncratic risks relative to macro risks.
Expanding the loan business through loan securitization will normally ex-
pose the bank relatively more to macroeconomic risks than to idiosyncratic
risks. Given the strong correlation between credit spreads and the market
return, as documented by [5], we hypothesize that the bank’s beta increases
with securitization and expansion. The empirical ﬁndings support this con-
jecture (section 3). We use a new data set of European securitizations to ana-
3lyze this beta eﬀect and the announcement eﬀect on the banks’ share prices.
While we ﬁnd no abnormal stock returns around the announcement date,
there is a signiﬁcant rise in the bank’s systematic risk. The cross sectional
analysis reveals some diﬀerences between static and dynamic transactions.
In the concluding section 4 we summarize our ﬁndings and discuss impli-
cations for banking supervision.
2 Tranching and the allocation of risk
2.1 Contract design
Information asymmetries are a major obstacle to trading debt claims, in
particular claims against small obligors about whom little is known publicly
[11]. Adverse selection and moral hazard of the bank create problems sim-
ilar to those in the insurance business. Therefore, suitable mechanisms of
protection are also applied in CDO transactions. The main instruments are
ﬁrst loss positions (deductibles in the case of insurance contracts) and risk
sharing arrangements (coinsurance in the case of insurance contracts). First
loss positions have been shown to be optimal arrangements in a number of
papers, including [1], [23], [8].
There are basically two types of CDO transactions, fully funded asset
backed securities (ABS) and synthetic transactions (CLN). In an ABS trans-
action the bank sells part of its loan portfolio to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) which reﬁnances itself through the issue of bonds. Usually the bank
h a st ot a k eaﬁrst loss position, i.e. the bank agrees to absorb default losses
u pt oas p e c i ﬁed limit. To achieve this, the bank can buy the non-rated
tranche (equity tranche) which absorbs all default losses up to its par value,
before other tranches have to bear any further losses. In addition or alterna-
tively, the bank can set up a reserve account which absorbs default losses in
a similar way. In these transactions, the bank can use the proceeds from the
sale of its loans to generate new business.
In a CLN (credit linked note) transaction the bank retains the loans, but
buys protection through a credit default swap with an SPV as the counter-
party: the SPV issues bonds and invests the proceeds in high quality debt
claims. The bank has no access to the proceeds. Quite often these proceeds
are only a small fraction of the value of the loan portfolio for which the bank
buys protection. Again, the bank usually takes a ﬁrst loss position by es-
tablishing a threshold such that the SPV has to compensate the bank for
4default losses of the underlying portfolio only for losses exceeding the thresh-
old. Moreover, the SPV never pays the bank a compensation in excess of the
value of the issued bonds. Hence, if this value is only a small fraction of the
initial value of the underlying loan portfolio, then the investors cover default
losses only up to this fraction. The bank thus retains the risk of default losses
exceeding those covered by the SPV. The bank may buy protection for these
risks through a senior credit default swap with a diﬀerent counterparty.
The importance of default risk for the size of the ﬁrst loss position can
be seen from a sample of 43 European CLO transactions, for which we could
get a standardized measure of portfolio default risk.
This is done by converting Moody´s weighted average rating factor or, if
it is not available, the weighted average quality of the underlying loans into
a weighted average default probability (wadp).W et h e nr e g r e s st h en o m i n a l
size of the ﬁrst loss piece on the weighted average default probability, the
issue date, and Moody´s diversity score (ds). The latter statistic captures
the diversiﬁcation of the underlying asset portfolio. Its score is increasing if
portfolio loans are spread more evenly within and across industries.
flp= c + β · wadp+ γ · ds + δ · date + ε
The regression result ﬁnds β to be positive and highly signiﬁcant (p =
0.00),w h i l eγ is negative and weakly signiﬁkant (p = .07); the adjusted R-
squared is 0.73.T h ei s s u ed a t ei si n s i g n i ﬁcant. Thus, the weighted average
default probability is a strong determinant of the size of the FLP, conﬁrming
our conjecture that the ﬁrst loss position increases with the expected default
loss of the underlying portfolio. As will be shown, the FLP thus yields
signiﬁcant investor protection against adverse selection and moral hazard.
The protective role of the FLP will become more apparent when, in the
next section, we simulate the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio,
and estimate the share of expected default losses covered by the ﬁrst loss
position.
The shape of the loss distribution is essential for understanding the rel-
evance of the diversity score for the size of the ﬁrst loss position. A large
diversity score is indicative of a steep loss distribution, with loss observations
being more heavily concentrated around the mode.
A common feature of asset securitizations is the allocation of portfolio risk
to several layers of claims. These layered claims, or tranches, obey the prin-
ciple of strict subordination. Losses up to the par value of the lowest tranche
are completely absorbed by the holders of this tranche. If accumulated losses
of the underlying asset portfolio exceed the par value of the lowest tranche,
which is the detachment point of the tranche and the attachment point of
the next senior tranche, the latter will absorb the remaining losses, up to
its detachment point, and so on for the remaining tranches. In this way,
5tranches which are more senior will only be aﬀected if the waterfall of losses
reaches their attachment point, after having wiped out all junior tranches.
According to the model in [7], optimal securitization design aims at a
structure that facilitates funding of relationship speciﬁca s s e t sb yu n i n f o r m e d ,
remote investors. Senior tranches are suited for these investors since, by
construction, they are largely free of default risk. Therefore, holders of senior
tranches are rarely exposed to the moral hazard component of the underlying
lending relationhips. Investors need not spend resources on monitoring the
underlying lending relationships, thus lowering the required tranche rate of
return in equilibrium1. Issuing mezzanine tranches to sophisticated investors
supports the reduction in delegation costs even further. These investors have
an expertise in risk assessment and monitoring, providing a buﬀer between
the ﬁrst loss piece held by the issuer and the senior piece held by remote
investors.
The number of distinct mezzanine tranches will therefore depend on the
shape of the loss rate distribution. How does the number of tranches of
a given transaction relate to the degree of diversiﬁcation and the default
probability of the underlying loan portfolio? An empirical estimate follows
from regressing the number of tranches on Moody’s diversity score and on
the weighted average default probability:
#tranches = c + β · wadp+ γ · ds + u
In a simple OLS regression using the same 43 European CLO transac-
t i o n sa sb e f o r e ,w eﬁnd that the diversity score has a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient (p =0 .00), while wadp is insigniﬁcant. The adjusted R-squared
is 0.2. Thus, after controlling for the default probability, a steeper loss rate
distribution is associated with a higher number of mezzanine layers. Inclu-
sion of the ﬁrst loss piece and the issue date does not change the regression
results.
The implications of [7] relate to the risk allocation achieved by tranching
the underlying collateral portfolio. By acquiring the senior tranche, remote
investors essentially take on macroeconomic risk. To be more precise, the
payoﬀ from holding a senior tranche is eﬀectively indexed to system wide
macroeconomic shocks. Deﬁne the macrofactor of default risks as the av-
erage default rate on the aggregate portfolio of debt claims. This factor is
random and, by deﬁnition, ranges in the (0,1) interval. Then a well-diversiﬁed
loan portfolio of average initial quality will only incur average default rates
beyond, say, ten percent if the macrofactor is in the same range. Hence the
senior tranches will only incur default losses if the macrofactor turns out to
1See [18] and [4] for a review of relationship lending and its role in a bank-oriented
ﬁnancial system.
6be very bad.
This is not to say that in a like situation there is no moral hazard of
the bank. It may well be that in a severe downturn situation banks do not
care much about their loans anymore. Moral hazard behavior may then be
diﬃcult to detect, so that reputational costs are low. Yet, the senior tranches
are only impaired if the macrofactor turns out to be bad. If the macrofactor
turns out to be good, then even strong moral hazard behavior is very unlikely
to aﬀect the senior tranches at all.
Thus, the structural aspects characterizing collateralized debt obligations
are devised to solve the inherent tension that exists between the originator
who has private information, and a diversiﬁed investor base without this
information, a problem much discussed in the corporate ﬁnance literature,
see [10] and [20].
In the next sections we will characterize the properties of junior and senior
tranches, building on the information provided in the oﬀering circulars of a
large number of European CDOs.
2.2 Estimating the loss distribution
To estimate the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio and the implied
loss allocation to the various tranches, we proceed as follows. First, we use
the information in the oﬀering circular2 on the quality of the underlying
loans and their initial portfolio weights, as indicated by a rating agency. If
this information is not available, we use the average initial loan quality as
indicated by a rating agency. Then we use Moody´s transition matrix for
diﬀerent loan qualities to estimate the default probabilities for particular
loans over the lifetime of the transaction: we use Monte Carlo simulation to
generate a distribution of rating migration paths assuming a 47.5% recovery
rate throughout. Absent better data on loss given default, these assumptions
are standard in the literature.
Multi-year asset value migration tables are derived from the one-year ta-
ble through repeated multiplication. The migration matrix is then mapped
into a matrix of standard normal threshold values. For each asset, a ran-
dom draw from the standard normal distribution yields a migration from the
beginning of the year to the end of the year rating notch. To arrive at a
2Oﬀering Circulars (OC) are oﬃcial documents describing the issue’s collateral com-
position, among many other contractual and legal details of the arrangement. OCs are
public information to be posted at issue date. In addition, most issues are accompanied
by pre-sale reports published by rating agencies
7portfolio return, the correlations between loan migrations need to be taken
into account. This is done by a Cholesky transformation.
For assets in the same industry (in diﬀerent industries), the correlation
coeﬃcient is initially set at 0.3 (0.0), following common practice[21]. Al-
terations of the assumptions on asset correlations will later on be used to
analyze the impact of systematic risk on loss correlations between tranches.
The generation of ﬁnal portfolio cash ﬂows and their allocation to the
tranches that constitute the issue is achieved in a last step. The cash ﬂows
of each period t are transformed in a realized ﬁnal (compound) value, RFVt,
using a ﬂat term structure of interest rates (4%). If a credit event is recorded
(default), then the assumed recovery is accounted for, and all further cash
ﬂows from this asset are set equal to zero. All ﬁnal cash ﬂows are allocated to
tranches according to the principle of subordination, as deﬁned in the oﬀering
circular. Finally, for each tranche, the nominal claims of each period, NVt,
are transformed into a ﬁnal value as well, NFVt. The sum of these ﬁnal
values over all tranches deﬁnes the ﬁnal value of all claims. The ratio of
these two ﬁnal values deﬁnes the portfolio loss rate, PLRT =1−
S
t RFVt S
t NFVt.
Using 50,000 observations, a loss distribution is generated that reﬂects the
loss cascading inherent in the tranche structure 3.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows the loss rate distribution of the London Wall 2002-2 trans-
action, issued by Deutsche Bank in 2002, which appears to be a typical ex-
ample of a CDO transaction. Here we assume an intra-industry correlation
of 0.3, and a zero interindustry correlation. The graph shows a pronounced
skewness. The expected loss is 150 bp (1.5/ %)w i t haﬁrst loss position of 246
bp. By retaining the FLP, the originator bears losses within the 91%-quantile
of the loss rate distribution. Hence, a large fraction of losses is not transfered
to investors, which serves as a strong barrier to adverse selection and moral
hazard.
2.3 Loss allocation in CDO transactions
How is the risk of an underlying portfolio allocated to tranches? In particular,
to what extent are expected losses, given the estimated probability distribu-
tion of loss rates, absorbed by the various tranches? In a typical issue, the
3There are a few simplifying assumptions: (i) there is no rating upgrade once an asset
has reached default status; (ii) a defaulted asset returns the recovery rate multiplied by
the nominal amount immediately; (iii) every asset has a bullet structure, there is no
prepayment.
8ﬁrst loss piece comprises between 2% and 10 % of the issue volume, while the
senior AAA-rated tranche comprises as much as 80-95%. Further evidence
is derived from looking at a sample of 40 European CDO-transactions with
close to 200 tranches, see the list in Table 7. This sample has some overlap
with the CLO-sample used for the regressions in section 2.1.
In calculating the loss distributions for this European CDO sample, we
rely on our own loss estimator, introduced in the last section. We then de-
termine the tranching by deﬁning the tranches such that their default prob-
abilities correspond to Moody’s multi-year default rate tables, starting with
the most senior tranche, and ending with the lowest rated tranche. The un-
rated ﬁrst loss piece is then determined by the attachment point of the lowest
rating tranche. Table 1 summarizes the results of this exercise. The table
presents average values by type of asset. We consider three asset classes,
collateralized loan obligations (CLO) with large loans and bonds, CLOs with
small corporate loans (CLO/SME), and the rest (other, including CBOs and
portfolios of CDO tranches). These asset classes diﬀer with respect to di-
versiﬁcation and relationship intensity. First, the degree of diversiﬁcation is
low for CBOs and high for CLO/SME issues, while CLOs are somewhat in
between, as evidenced by the average diversity scores. Second, the relation-
ship character of the underlying lending relationship is probably highest in
t h ec a s eo ft h eS M El o a n s ,a n dl o w e s ti nt h ec a s eo fC B O s ,w h i c ht y p i c a l l y
comprise bonds issued by large caps.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 uses a broad classiﬁcation of 40 European transactions issued
between January 1999 and July 20024. It is instructive to compare the second
and the fourth column, SME CLOs and CBOs, because the underlying assets
diﬀer. The former consists of bank loans extended to small and mid sized
industry, while the latter refers to bonds issued by large corporates. Not
only is the average issue size of SME portfolios about 80% higher than that
of the average CBO portfolio, but also the number of loans by far exceeds the
number of bonds, suggesting that SME CLOs are more granular, i.e. more
diversiﬁed than CBOs. The table also shows that while the average size of
the ﬁrst loss piece is similar for both issue types5,i tc o v e r sam u c hw i d e r
portion of the loss rate distribution in case of CBOs. The size of their FLPs
is on average 3.36 times the expected loss of the underlying portfolio, and it is
1.34 times in case of SME-CLOs, although the diﬀerence in rating quality of
t h eu n d e r l y i n gp o r t f o l i o si ss m a l l .D u et ot h ed i ﬀerence in ﬁr s tl o s sp o s i t i o n s ,
the median rating of the most junior rated tranche of the CBO transactions
4All issues were selected for which we could get the oﬀering circular.
5T h es i z eo ft h eﬁrst loss piece is measured in percent of the underlying portfolio volume.
9is several notches higher than its counterpart among SME-CLO transactions,
see Table 1. CBO ﬁrst loss pieces cover 0.96 of the cumulative density of the
underlying portfolio’s loss rate distribtion, on average. The remaining risk to
be allocated to investors is relatively small, allowing for only 2.85 additional
tranches to be issued for CBOs. This number is signiﬁcantly lower than in
case of SME CLOs where it reaches 4.57.
In all asset classes, the ﬁrst loss piece covers more than 100% of the mean
expected loss. Variations are sizeable, but there is no clear picture across
asset classes. The average size of the ﬁrst loss piece is 7.1%,w i t has i g n i ﬁcant
variation between Non-SME CLOs and CCBOs. As a consequence, FLPs
take over most of the expected losses, and the losses allocated to the senior
tranche are restricted to extreme, systematic events. Their expected value
is very low, 0.01% of the tranche volume on average, as is their default
probability (0.5%).
2.3.1 Eﬀects on the bank’s overall default risk
Assuming a true sale with all tranches being sold to outside investors, except
the ﬁrst loss piece, what are the consequences for the risk exposure of the
bank? The answer depends on several aspects: ﬁrst, what other assets does
t h eb a n kh a v eo ni t sb o o ka n dh o wa r et h e i rc a s hﬂows and default risks
correlated with those of the securitized loans? Second, what would be the
eﬀect of securitizing all default risks? Third, how does securitization change
the bank‘s loan policy? In order to improve our understanding, we consider a
bank with a portfolio of 50 identical loans extended to obligors in 5 diﬀerent
industries, one year to maturity, and the same quality. The latter is set equal
to a B rating, implying a 8.5 % default rate[17]. The bank can either keep the
loans in its books, or securitize them. For the securitized portfolio, the bank
retains a non-rated tranche of 10.11 percent, i.e. a ﬁrst loss position. The
bank then reinvests the proceeds amounting to (100−10.11) percent in new
loans to obligors with the same properties as those in the initial loan book.
Hence the on-balance sheet loan book of the bank, including the retained
ﬁr s tl o s sp i e c e ,h a st h es a m es i z ea sb e f o r es e c u r i t i z a t i o n .
Table 2 shows the ﬁrst four moments of the distribution of loss rates (1) for
the original loan portfolio without securitization and (2) for the new portfolio
whose default losses are composed of those from the FLP of the securitized
portfolio plus all default losses from the newly granted loans. The moments
depend on the assumed intra- and interindustry correlations, therefore we re-
port diﬀerent correlations scenarios. In the ﬁrst, the base case, intra-industry
dependence is set a 0.3, while inter-industry correlation is zero. The other
scenarios assume a stronger dependency, suggesting the existence of a com-
10mon systematic factor. Higher correlations reﬂect a stronger macrofactor of
default risks.
Table 2 about here
First, consider the eﬀect of securitization and reinvestment in the cor-
relation base case. Figure 2 plots the diﬀerence between the default rate
distribution of the new and that of the original portfolio. The graph indi-
cates that securitization and reinvestment lower the default probabilities in
the range 0 to 18 %, and raise them in the range 18 to 46 %. Therefore, the
mean loss rate of the new portfolio is higher than the respective rate of the
original portfolio. The ratio of the mean of the new portfolio over that of the
original portfolio is not just (1 + (1 − 0.1011)) = 1.8989, but clearly lower.
The reason is that in the new portfolio the loss of the securitized portfolio is
restricted to the FLP.
More diﬃcult to grasp are the eﬀects on the second, third and fourth
moments of the loss rate distribution. First, consider the standard deviation.
In Table 2 the standard deviation of the new portfolio exceeds that of the
original portfolio. Intuitively, this is explained by scaling up losses through
securitization and reinvestment. But this is not true in general. Let the par
value of the original portfolio be 1 $. If the bank securitizes this portfolio
taking a FLP of 0.1 $, it grants new loans for 0.9 $.L e t σop denote the
standard deviation of the loss of the original portfolio, σflp the standard
deviation of the loss on the FLP, and ρ the correlation coeﬃcient between
losses. Then the variance of the new portfolio equals
σ2
flp+2· 1 · 0.9 · ρ · σop · σflp+0 .92 · σ2
op
while the variance of the original portfolio equals σ2
op. Obviously, the
variance of the new portfolio is smaller than that of the original portfolio
if the FLP is small relative to expected loss so that it will be exhausted by
losses with high probability. In the limit, σflp tends to zero, implying the
variance of the new portfolio roughly to equal 81% of the variance of the
original portfolio. Therefore it is not obvious whether the bank’s standard
deviation of default losses will increase or decline through securitization and
reinvestment. From Table 2 one can see that skewness and kurtosis of the
new portfolio decrease relative to the original portfolio. From Figure 2, this
is not surprising given a shift of the probability mass from the lower tail to
the center. This eﬀect is more dramatic for the kurtosis than for the skewness
which raises the diﬀerences to the mean to the fourth instead of the third
power.
11This latter eﬀect can be seen more clearly from Table 3, which compares
the exceedance probabilities before and after securitization, for various levels
of loss rates. The exceedance probability is deﬁned as the cumulative proba-
bility of exceeding the benchmark loss rate. While the exceedance probabil-
ities are identical for a 0 % benchmark loss rate, they quickly diverge for all
positive rates. The exceedance probability is always higher after securitiza-
tion, with reaching a maximum diﬀerence at a benchmark loss rate of 20 %,
where the probabilities are 15.91 % and 62.34 %, respectively. At the 40 %
benchmark, the exceedance probability is almost zero before securitization
(0.02 %) ,w h i l ei ti ss t i l l0 . 5 9% after securitization. These ﬁgures show that
the change in the loss rate distribution caused by securitization is not merely
a shift of the distribution, but also a spreading out of the distribution.
Second, we look at the eﬀects of correlations on these results. Of course,
correlations have no eﬀect on the average default rate of the original port-
f o l i o . T h i si sa l w a y st h es a m e( a r o u n d5 , 6 7 %) even though the simulation
produces slight diﬀerences. Figure 3 displays the diﬀerence between two fre-
quency distributions of default losses of the original portfolio, the ﬁrst being
determined by correlations(0.7; 0.3) , the second by (0.3; 0.0) with the ﬁrst
number being the intraindustry correlation and the second the interindustry
correlation. Raising the correlations shifts probability mass from the range
(6—2 4%) to both tails. Therefore, the standard deviation, the skewness
and the kurtosis of the default rate of the original portfolio increase with
correlations.
More complex is the eﬀect of correlations on the default rate distribution
of the new portfolio. Figure 3 indicates that a FLP of about 10 percent has
to bear small losses (1 — 5 %) with higher probabilities, and high losses (6-
10 %) with lower probabilities. Hence, in this example, higher correlations
imply a lower average loss for the FLP. This also explains in Table 2 why
the ratio of average losses of the new over the original portfolio declines with
higher correlations.
Table 2 also indicates for our example that standard deviation and skew-
ness of the new portfolio increase with correlations, while this is not always
true of the kurtosis. The relative increase in standard deviation (new over
original portfolio) tends to slightly decline with higher correlations. The
relative changes in skewness and kurtosis do not display such regular pat-
terns.The simulation exercise begs the question whether securitization and
reinvstment will have an impact on the systematic risk of a ﬁnancial interme-
diary. We have assumed that ﬁrst loss pieces will be retained, while all other
tranches are not. Under these assumptions, tranching and reinvestment may
change the granularity of the underlying loan book, which in turn aﬀects
12systematic cash ﬂow risk. As a result, the bank’s beta might be aﬀected as
well. We will look into this matter next.
3 Share price reactions to the issue of Collat-
eralized Debt Obligations
In this section we want to analyze how the securitization of loan assets af-
fects the equity valuation of the bank. In accordance with the last section,
emphasis will be on eﬀects that are due to tranching and reinvestment. Ear-
lier studies, including the event studies by [14] and [22], have neglected the
important risk repackaging aspect of loan securitization.
3.1 Hypotheses and test design
Our main hypothesis relates the eﬀects of tranching and reinvestment to the
systematic risk of the bank. As described in the preceding section, optimal
tranching tailors the equity piece to the expected default rate of the loan
portfolio. When the equity piece is retained by the originator, while other
tranches are sold or swapped to external investors, securitization and rein-
vestment will systematically alter the risk exposure of the bank. Note that
reinvestment is limited to the funded portion of the issue, up to 100% in true-
sale transactions. In particular, reinvestment in loans of comparable quality
to the existing loan portfolio will raise the granularity of the bank’s loan
book, reducing the importance of idiosyncratic default risks. Therefore the
correlation between the bank’s default losses and a macrofactor of corporate
default risk should increase.
Moreover, our simulation results indicate that the standard deviation of
the bank’s default losses increases if the ﬁrst loss position is suﬃciently high
so that the standard deviation of the default losses due to this ﬁrst loss
position is suﬃciently high. Then securitization and reinvestment raise the
standard deviation of the bank’s default losses and its correlation with the
macro factor of default risks.
The question then is how this translates into changes of the bank‘s stock
return beta. Elton/Gruber/Agrawal [5] found a correlation of 0.6 to 0.8
between the credit spread changes of a corporate bond and the stock returns
of the corporation. This suggests a high correlation between the macrofactor
of default risks and the stock market return. We hypothesize that a higher
correlation between a bank’s default losses and the macrofactor of default
13risks translates into a higher correlation between the bank’s equity return
and the market index.
We also hypothesize that a higher standard deviation of the bank’s default
losses raises the standard deviation of the bank’s stock return. Both eﬀects
would imply a higher beta. Furthermore, these risk eﬀects are expected to be
stronger for banks that engage repeatedly in securitizations and that, over
time, increase the share of equity tranches among its assets. This is our ﬁrst
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Issuance of collateralized debt obligations and reinvestment
of proceeds in new loans will raise the bank’s beta. This eﬀect will be stronger
for repeated transactions.
We investigate the securitization impact on the bank’s stock beta since
we are interested in the impact on the shareholder position. Alternatively,
one might look at the securitization impact on the bank’s shareholders and
bondholders. Then the bank’s beta deﬁned by the joint stock and bond return
and the joint market index of stock and bond returns, would be relevant. This
would require daily returns on the bank’s debt a large part of which is not
securitized. Thus, the necessary data are not available. Therefore, we use
the conventional beta approach.
The ﬁrst hypothesis relates to beta changes after securitizations, rather
than expected securitizations. Otherwise one would expect to observe the
compound risk shifting eﬀe c ta tt h et i m eo ft h eﬁrst issue, t0. Announcement
eﬀects of new CDO issues on beta would then be indeterminate, because their
impact on the bank’s risk exposure would have been anticipated, though
possibly with noise.
We now turn to the stock price reaction triggered by the announcement
of the securitization, as captured by the abnormal return in a typical event
study. The abnormal return is determined by the expectation of investors,
given the information contained in the issue announcement6.I fs t o c k h o l d e r s
interpret the securitization as a pure change in the bank‘s ﬁnancing strat-
egy, then in a perfect market there should be no stock price eﬀect unless the
change in the ﬁnancing strategy redistributes wealth from the stockholders
to the bondholders, or vice versa. Since the stockholders hold the equity
piece and the bondholders hold the senior tranche of the bank‘s assets, se-
curitization should typically reduce the expected default losses of the bank‘s
6From conversation with practitioners we know that the valuation of CDO mezzanine
tranches is typically preceded by a boookbuilding period resembling an English auction,
as modeled in [19].
14bondholders and, thus, enrich them at the expense of the stockholders. This
would argue in favor of a negative stock price reaction.
Similarly, if the bank uses an ABS transaction to obtain new funding,
then stockholders may interpret the transaction as unfavorable information
about the bank‘s funding needs and react by a stock price decline. This,
however, would not be true for a synthetic transaction because then the
bank does not receive funding. Finally, the transaction cost of securitization
is nonnegligible adding to a negative stock price impact.
On the other side, the securitization enables the bank to expand its loan
business. This may be considered by the stockholders as a valuable real
option of the bank so that the stock price should increase. Similarly, the
securitization protects the bank against major default losses, and thereby
reduces the costs of ﬁnancial distress. This would also be good news for the
stockholders.
Summarizing, the net impact of securitization on the bank‘s stock price is
hard to predict. Across the entire sample we do not expect signiﬁcant stock
price reactions to the announcement of securitizations.
Hypothesis 2 The announcement of a CDO-transaction by a bank does not
lead to a signiﬁcant reaction of it´s stock price.
We shall test this hypothesis, ﬁrst, by looking at all transactions, and
second, by looking at diﬀerent subsets of transactions to ﬁnd out whether
the hypothesis holds equally well for all these subsets.
There are a number of characteristics that may be relevant cross-sectionally.
Among these characteristics is the synthetic nature of a deal, because syn-
thetic deals eliminate the funding component in an issue and, therefore, syn-
thetic issues have a smaller impact on the bank’s asset composition, relative
to a fully funded transaction.
A second characteristic of securitization transactions that may be relevant
for cross sectional diﬀerences is the nature of the issue as static or dynamic.
Static issues maintain the original asset composition of the collateral port-
folio throughout the life of the transaction. This typically implies a gradual
redemption of the outstanding issue, in accordance with repayment of the
underlying loans. Dynamic issues, in contrast, tend to maintain their origi-
nal volume throughout the entire term of the issue. If loans in the collateral
portfolio are redeemed, the issuer replaces them by new loans, safeguarding
certain quality standards. While replenishment standards vary between is-
sues, a general implication is that banks are required to assign new loans to
the collateral portfolio in a systematic, non-random way.
15Since both properties - synthetic/true-sale and static/dynamic- exert an
inﬂuence on the asset composition of the bank, we expect both characteristics
to be consequential for the value eﬀect of the issue announcement.
We use an event study methodology. Since there are many event data
in a relatively short period of time with a lot of overlap, and since there
are several banks with repeated issues, the abnormal return regressions are
run as a system. To account for contemporaneous correlations between the
regressors, we employ the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method-
ology. Contemporaneous correlation between regressors is to be expected,
since we observe some clustering of the event dates (see Figure 4). The re-
gression system is run in calendar time rather than in event time, so that
contemporaneous correlations are properly accounted for7.
Figure 4 about here
3.2 Data and results of the event study
In compiling our data set we initially looked at all transactions in Moody’s
European Securitization list of June 2003. The number of issues is 254, of
which 185 have a Moody’s "New Issue Report". It is this New Issue Report
that contains the information required for conducting the study, including a
description of the underlying assets as well as the covenants relevant for the
issue. Among the many other features of the issue, the Report also contains
t h ep r i c i n go ft h et r a n c h e sa tt h ei s s u ed a t ea n dt h en a m eo ft h eo r i g i n a t o r .
Not every issue has a single originator8.
For 112 transactions we were able to identify the originator. We imposed
the additional restriction that the originator is a listed company (else no stock
price is available), and arrive at a sample of 92 transactions from 31 banks.
We excluded the non-European banks and ﬁnally have 75 transactions issued
by 27 banks. These issues are used for the event study and, later on, for the
cross sectional analysis.
Table 4 presents the descriptives for our ﬁnal data set. In the upper panel
of Table 4 one can see that the average size of transactions is small relative
to the entire balance sheet, up to 2 % of total assets. The average number
of tranches over all transactions is about 6. The lower panel refers to a
7With 75 x 240 observations, there are enough degrees of freedom to estimate all
coeﬃcients in the SUR system.
8Several ABS products are managed arbitrage deals that pass through the cash ﬂows
of several originators at once.
16subsample of the 75 issues, comprising 51 issues. It excludes all transactions
w h o s ei s s u ed a t ei sl e s st h a n5m o n t h s( 1 0 0d a y s )a f t e ra n o t h e ri s s u eb yt h e
same bank. This subsample will later be used in the regression analysis. For
repeat issuers this share of balance sheet assets adds up to 5-10 % of total
assets, and in some cases an even larger share of the total loan book. The
basic model is an augmented event study estimation.
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + γ1,iDevent
i + γ2,iDother event
i + β
∆
i D
after
i Rm,t + εi ;
t = −20,...,+20.
The dependent variable Ri,t as well as the independent variable Rm,t are
excess returns, deﬁned as the log return minus log German interbank-one
month lending rate, FIBOR (EURIBOR since 1999). The explanatory vari-
ables include the log of market excess return, deﬁned as the DJ EuroSTOXX
index, the dummy Devent whose coeﬃcient captures the abnormal return over
the event window. The window extends from day -20 to day +20 around the
announcement date. Announcement dates were assumed to be the ﬁrst pub-
lic notiﬁcation that could be identiﬁed in Lexis-Nexis, or in pre-sale reports
of the three major agencies.
The estimation uses a 200-days window, symmetrically around the event
window. Thus, for each event the time series extends over 240 trading days,
approximately one year. Since we are interested in a possible change of
systematic risk, the regression has a second variable capturing systematic
risk, delta-beta(β
∆), which is multiplied by a dummy, Dafter, which equals
one for the 100 days following the event window, again (-20, +20). The
coeﬃcient β
∆ measures the extent to which the after-event beta diverges
from its pre-event value. The null hypothesis sets delta after-event beta at
zero.
The estimation is complicated by the fact that for many cases in our
sample, there are repeat issuers, and the interval between two consecutive
announcement dates by the same issuer frequently is less than 100 days. Since
a separate regression is run for every transaction, there is overlap among the
estimation windows. In order to disentangle the eﬀect of the original event
on beta from the eﬀect of a later event, we include a dummy "other event",
Dother event,w h o s ec o e ﬃcient captures abnormal returns in a -20/+20 days
window around the later event.
However, in some cases there is more than one "other event", up to a
maximum of three. To deal with these frequent issue-cases, we set the dummy
Dafter equal to two (three) for the second (third) overlapping event. Thus,
we force β
∆ to be of the same order of magnitude for all successive and
overlapping events. Due to the overlap of events, and the relatively short
p e r i o df o rw h i c hd a t aa r ea v a i l a b l e( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2 ) ,w ee s t i m a t et h ee q u a t i o n sa s
a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The SUR methodology
17increases the eﬃciency of the estimation in that correlations between the
error terms are accounted for. Note that within the SUR framework, the daily
returns are aligned in calendar time, so that the contemporaneous correlation
is duely taken care of.
A second set of regressions explores the cross-sectional determinants of
two key variables in our analysis, the abnormal return (γ1,i) and the change
in systematic risk (β
∆
i ). The estimated model is, where Xj :
©
γ1,i,β
∆
i
ª
,
Xj = αj + λ1,jDdynamic + λ2,jDsynthetic + λ3,jDCLO + λ4,jDCBO+
λ5,jDother + λ6−8,jDyear + εj
T h ee x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e sg e n e r a t ep a r t i t i o n so ft h es a m p l e . I np a r -
ticular, Ddynamic is a dummy variable that equals one for managed issues,
i.e. collateral portfolios that are being replenished over the life of the is-
sue. Dsynthetic separates between synthetic and fully funded true sale issues,
where the dummy equals one for synthetic issues. DCLO, DCBO,a n dDother
subdivides the sample into four categories according to the type of the un-
derlying asset portfolio, as loans, bonds, mortgages (the reference group),
and all others (e.g. credit card or leasing claims). The Dyear-dummy stands
for the issue years, with 2002 as the reference year.
Tables 5 and 6 report the result of the regressions. We will discuss the
ﬁndings starting with Table 5. The augmented event study produces two
important results. First, looking at regression A.1 with overlap, the aver-
age cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date (-20, +20)
is very small and statistically insigniﬁcant. This holds true for the event
window (γ1), as well for any overlapping other event window (γ2). This
ﬁnding supports Hypothesis 2 and is consistent with the result in [22]. The
regression in Table 6 analyzes the determinants of γ1 and reveals that the av-
erage cumulative return in 1998 diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that in 1999 (λ6−8).
Returning to the time series regression A.1 in Table 5, we observe that the
coeﬃc i e n tm e a s u r i n gac h a n g eo fs y s t e m a t i cr i s ka f t e rt h ee v e n t ,β
∆,i sp o s i -
tive and signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r o .I t sp o s i t i v es i g ns u g g e s t st h a tb a n k s
engaged in securitizations are increasing their exposure vis-a-vis the markt
return. Since the coeﬃcient captures the average increase in systematic risk
per overlapping event, the risk increasing eﬀect of asset securitizations is
higher for repeat issuers than it is for one-time issuers. Thus, hypothesis 1
is conﬁrmed.
In regression A.2 of Table 5 we reran the regression supressing all obser-
vations with overlapping events. By construction, the subsample has fewer
observations (51 instead of 75), and it underrepresents repeat issuers, i.e.
18large issuers. While the γ1-coeﬃcient is similar in size and signiﬁcance, β
∆
is now much smaller and only marginally signiﬁcant (p = .09).T h u s , t h e
beta-increasing eﬀect of securitizations is more relevant and more visible for
institutions that engage repeatedly in securitizations, and that are more likely
to systematically alter their loan portfolio as a consequence of their access
to the capital market.
The cross section analysis of β
∆reported in Table 6 oﬀers additional in-
sight in what drives the increase in beta after securitizations. Among the
structural characteristics, the dummy for managed issues, λ1, is the only one
that turns out signiﬁcant. Since its sign is negative, it signiﬁes that managed
issues have a lower increase in systematic risk, i.e. the bank may be less
motivated to increase granularity in the aftermath of a securitization, or the
bank may be more concerned to restrict the new risks to avoid early termina-
tion of the transaction, relative to static deals. The variables representing the
type of underlying asset, like CLOs, CBOs remain insigniﬁcant altogether.
Clearly, these ﬁndings are explorative in nature, and they will have to
be followed up by an integration of structural data concerning the collateral
assets as well as balance sheet details of the bank.
3.3 Conclusions
An evaluation of the economic implications of securitizations for ﬁnancial
institutions risk management and for ﬁnancial stability on the macro level
necessitates ﬁrst and foremost an understanding of the eﬀective risk transfer.
In this paper we have analyzed the design of CDO transactions and its im-
pact on the default risk exposure of the originating bank. Adverse selection
and moral hazard problems, which are considered strong barriers to trading
default risks, are largely eliminated by a substantial ﬁrst loss position of the
originator. The size of the ﬁrst loss position has been shown to increase with
the average default probability of the underlying portfolio. The tranching
typically leads to a large senior tranche which in the case of a fully funded
transaction may be sold to remote investors. Securitization then protects the
originator against high default losses that otherwise would lead to ﬁnancial
distress. The impact of securitization and reinvestment on the bank’s default
risk is illustrated by a simulation exercise which also illustrates the impact
of correlations on the bank‘s risk exposure. If the bank uses the securitiza-
tion proceeds to expand its loan business, then its systematic default risk
tends to increase. This tends to translate also into an increase in its stock
19beta, as conﬁrmed by the empirical ﬁndings. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
securitization announcement eﬀect on the bank‘s stock price.
The economic consequences of securitization are depending as much on
the way the issue is tranched as on the way these tranches are allocated to
investors. First, the tranching technique allows to largely separate idiosyn-
cratic from systemic risks. Assuming that the default risk of corporate loans
depends on the relationship between the bank and its customers, tranch-
ing allows to allocate information-sensitive risks predominantly to the ﬁrst
loss piece, and to a lessor extent to the mezzanine pieces, while the senior
tranches are largely free of these risks. In turn, extreme or systemic risks are
borne predominantly by the holders of the senior tranches. The return of
these senior tranches is eﬀectively indexed to systemwide economic shocks.
To the extent that loan securitizations replace the traditional ﬁnancing of
banks through deposits, one may conclude that bank funding is indexed to
macro risks9.
Second, the economic consequences of loan securitization on ﬁnancial
stability also depend upon the allocation of tranches to diﬀerent types of
investors. To realize an optimal sharing of risk, the ﬁrst loss piece of the
issues should be retained by the originator of the loans, because then his
incentives as a lender are kept intact. In contrast, senior tranches have to be
allocated to remote investors in order to improve ﬁnancial system stability.
Remote investors, like pension funds, are deﬁned as being located outside the
ﬁnancial system. The reason is that it is them who are in a better position
to withstand a systemic shock to ﬁnancial markets that otherwise endanger
the stability of the ﬁnancial system at large.
The advantages emanating from risk sharing between originating banks
and remote investors require that ﬁrst loss pieces are retained by the orig-
inator, and that senior tranches are eﬀectively held by investors operating
outside the core ﬁnancial system. The latter condition implies that banks
and insurance companies are neither investing in CDO senior tanches, nor
retaining the senior tranches. Both conditions are likely to be violated in
many markets today. The actual allocation of these tranches to investors in
the economy is of particular relevance for bank supervisors. Furthermore, the
treatment of asset securitizations in the new Basle II framework, in particu-
lar concerning the allocation of systemic risks, will play an important role in
achieving a desirable allocation of tranches. It may well be that the low risk
weight for senior tranches, proposed under the new Basle II rules, is not high
9Tranching and securitization can overcome the obstacles that have prevented the in-
troduction of indexed deposits to date, see [12] and [13] for a discussion of macro risk
indexation for bank deposits.
20enough to motivate banks to sell senior tranches. One may therefore specu-
late that transparency concerning tranche allocation vis-a-vis the supervisory
authorities will one day become an important instrument of ﬁnancial stability
assessment and management.
This suggests a demand for more research along the lines we have pre-
sented in this paper. On the modeling side, the correlation structure between
tranches of diﬀerent seniority is relevant for CDO bond portfolio management
and for assessing ﬁnancial system stability. For example, a change in the
correlation between asset classes not only alters the default probabilities of
tranches, but it also alters the joint default probabilities of diﬀerent tranches,
as suggested by Table 3. This latter statistic is relevant for an analysis of
contagion eﬀects, as pointed out by [15] and [2]. On the empirical side, the
eﬀective allocation of tranches to investor groups is of importance, as is the
expanded role of commercial banks as intermediaries between capital markets
and the corporate sector, as discussed in [16].
It appears that the securitization of bank loans provides an eﬃcient new
tool to combine the advantages of bank- and market-based ﬁnancial systems.
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23Figure 1: Loss distribution of London Wall 2002-2, 50’000 iterations
This table displays the loss distribution of London Wall, as it was simulated using the information con-
tained in the Oﬀering Circular. A loss rate distribution for the entire portfolio is generated that takes into
account the correlation within and between industries and the credit migration risks referencing Moody’s
tables. The chart shows on the vertical axis the frequency of observations, and on the horizontal axis the
associated loss rate, truncated at 13 %. There was no observation surpassing this threshold.
24Figure 2: Securitization and reinvestment: Impact on marginal loss distrib-
ution, 10’000 iterations
This table displays the diﬀerential loss rate distribution of a simulated loan portfolio with and without
securitization, followed by reinvestment. The original portfolio consists of 50 B-rated loans of equal par
value with one year to maturity, split evenly across ﬁve industries. The new portfolio is obtained by
securitizing the original portfolio retaining a ﬁrst loss piece of 10.11 percent and reinvesting the par value
of the original position minus the ﬁrst loss piece in another portfolio which has the same characteristics.
The loss given default is assumed to be 52.5 percent. The pairwise within-industry correlations are 0.3,
while pairwise between-industry correlations are assumed to equal 0.0. The resulting diﬀerential loss rate
distribution is displayed in the ﬁgure.
25Figure 3: Impact on marginal loss distribution of an increase in correlation,
10’000 iterations
This table displays the diﬀerential loss rate distribution of a simulated loan portfolio with a low and a
higher level of correlation. The original portfolio consists of 50 B-rated loans of equal par value with one
year to maturity, split evenly across ﬁve industries. The loss given default is assumed to be 52.5 percent for
each defaulting loan. The pairwise within-industry correlations are 0.3, while pairwise between-industry
correlations are assumed to equal 0.0. These values increase to 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. The resulting
diﬀerential loss rate distribution is displayed in the ﬁgure.
26Figure 4: Time series of announcement dates
This ﬁgure plots the announcement of all 75 announcement dates between January 1999 and September
2002.
27Table 1: Loss rate distribution of European CDOs: Descriptive Statistics
This table summarizes basic characteristics of the CDO sample used in the estimation of expected and
unexpected loss. SME CLOs are collateralized loan obligations where underlyings comprise loans to small
and medium size ﬁrms, CBOs are collateralized bond obligations, with large ﬁrm corporate bonds as
underlyings, and Non-SME CLOs are a mixture of the two asset classes, comprising corporate bonds and
loans to large ﬁrms. The numbers in the table are averages across the transactions listed in the column.
Total volume is the amount in EUR of the portfolio underlying the transaction, the number of tranches is
t h en u m b e ro fi s s u e dt r a n c h e s ,e x c l u d i n gt h eF L P .S i z eF L Pi st h en o m i n a lv a l u eo fat r a n c h er e l a t i v et o
the nominal amount of the issue in funded and unfunded transactions, Size Senior Tranche is the nominal
value of a tranche relative to the nominal amount of the issue in funded and unfunded transactions,
FLP/E(L) is the size of the FLP tranche relative to expected loss E(L) of the underlying portfolio, and
the FLP quantile is the cumulative density of losses not exceeding the size of the ﬁrst loss piece.
28Table 2: Reinvestment of securitization proceeds: Simulation results for the
loss rate distributions
This table summarizes the results of a simulation exercise. The original portfolio consists of 50 B-rated
loans of equal par value with one year to maturity, split evenly across ﬁve industries. The new portfolio is
obtained by securitizing the original portfolio retaining a ﬁrst loss piece of 10.11 percent and reinvesting
the par value of the original position minus the ﬁrst loss piece in another portfolio which has the same
characteristics. The loss given default is assumed to be 52.5 percent. There are three scenarios in the
table, which diﬀer by their correlation assumptions. The lower panel shows the ﬁrst four moments of the
resulting loss rate distribution for the bank’s loan book, including the retained ﬁrst loss tranches, for the
three scenarios. The ﬁrst column (original portfolio) describes the loan book before securitization, the
second (new portfolio) describes the loan book after the securitization transaction.
29Table 3: Change of loss rate distribution due to securitization
This table summarizes the results of a comparison of loss rate distributions before and after the securi-
tization of a loan portfolio. It is assumed that the securitization proceeds are reinvested in a new loan
portfolio of the same quality as the old portfolio. The ﬁgures in the table refer to the results of a simula-
tion exercise with 10,000 runs. The original portfolio consists of 50 B-rated loans of equal par value with
one year to maturity, split evenly across ﬁve industries. The new portfolio is obtained by securitizing the
original portfolio retaining a ﬁrst loss piece of 10.11 percent and reinvesting the par value of the original
position minus the ﬁrst loss piece in another portfolio which has the same characteristics. The loss given
default is assumed to be 52.5 percent. The pairwise within-industry correlations are 0.3, while pairwise
between-industry correlations are assumed to equal 0.0. The benchmark loss rate in the ﬁrst column
speciﬁes a level of loss rates, while the ﬁgures in the two remaining columns refer to the frequency of loss
rate exceedances in the simulation exercise, relative to the benchmark. Column 2 reports the frequency
for the original loan portfolio, whereas column 3 lists the frequencies after securitization and reinvestment.
30Table 4: European CDO data set: descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the CDO data set. The numbers (except no. of issues) are
averages across transactions. The upper panel uses information of 74 of the 77 issues underlying the
estimations in section 3. For the remaining three issues there were no balance sheet data available on
Datastream, the source of these data. The lower panel represents a subsample, which contains only
those issues that did not experience a repeat issue by the same issuer within ﬁve months after the ﬁrst
transaction. There are two issues without balance sheetd a t ai nD a t a s t r e a m ,l e a d i n gt o5 1i s s u e si n c l u d e d
in Panel II. ’Size’ is the Euro volume of collateral assets underlying the issue, "Number of tranches" is
taken from the oﬀering circulars. All tranches, including non rated tranches, are considered. "Share of
balance sheet assets" divides Size by total assets of the bank. "Equity (book value)" is the sum of equity
and open reserves, according to Datastream.
31Table 5: Announcement eﬀects: regression results
This table reports the results of the event study relating to the announcement of CDO issues. A SUR
estimation of the determinants of excess stock returns of the issuing banks was employed. The ﬁrst
regression (A.1) is a time series estimation with 75 events over a window of 240 trading days. The second
regression (A.2) has 51 events, excluding overlapping events by the same issuer (multiple issuers). All
regressions use data from the period January 1999 to December 2002. The dependent variable in both
regressions is R(it), the daily return on 27 banks (from Datastream). The explanatory variables are R(mt),
D(event), D(other event) and D(after). R(mt) is the return on the EuroStoxx taken from Datastream.
D(event) equals one for the event window [-20,+20], where the event is the announcement date of the
CDO issue, D(other event) equals one for all other event windows in the period [-120,+120], and D(after)
equals one for the period [+20,+120]. Wald-statistics (p-values) are in parentheses.
32Table 6: Announcement eﬀects: second stage regression results
This table reports the results of the event study relating to the announcement of CDO issues. A SUR
estimation of the determinants of excess stock returns of the issuing banks was employed. The regressions
in this table are cross-sectional estimates of the determinants of delta-beta and gamma 1 from the regres-
sion in Table 5, i.e. the change in systematic risk after an event, and the cumulative abnormal return in
the event window. The explanatory variables are D(dyn), D(syn), D(CLO), D(CBO), D(other), D(99),
D(00), D(01). D(dyn) equals one for a managed issue, D(syn) equals one for a synthetic issue. D(CLO),
D(CBO) and D(other) equal one when the collateral portfolio consists of loans, bonds, or other assets.
Mortgage backed securities are the reference group. D(99), D(00) and D(01) equal one for the issue year
1999, 2000 or 2001. p-values are in parentheses. As in Table 5, the estimation is with 75 events over a
window of 240 trading days.All regressions use data from the period January 1999 to December 2002.
33Table 7: List of European CDO issues used for loss rate estimation
This table summarizes descriptive statistics of the issues that have been used to calculate
the loss rate distribution for the sample of European CDOs.
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